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Employment Discrimination

by Peter Reed Corbin'
and
E.
John Duval*f
Perhaps the most surprising development during the 1994 survey
period is what did not happen, as opposed to what did happen.1 The
anticipated stampede of decisions under the Americans With Disabilities
Act of 19902 (the "ADA"), has not yet happened, at least at the circuit
court of appeals level. Not a single ADA case was handed down by the
Eleventh Circuit during the survey period. Since, at last count, there
were over 30,000 ADA charges pending3 at the administrative charge
* Shareholder in the firm ofCorbin, Dickinson, Duvall & Kitchen, Jacksonville, Florida.
University of Virginia (B.A., 1970); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University
(J.D. cur laude, 1975). Member, State Bar of Georgia and The Florida Bar.
** Shareholder in the firm of Corbin, Dickinson, Duvall & Kitchen, Jacksonville,
Florida. Florida State University (B.S. 1973); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University (J.D. cur laude, 1985). Member, The Florida Bar.
1. This Article will cover significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during calendar year 1994. Cases arising under the following federal
statutes are included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701718, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)); the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 2-15, 81 Stat,
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)); the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 and
scattered sections (Supp. 1992)); the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat.
56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)); the Americans With Disabilities Act
of 1990 ("ADA"), Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 1-108, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 12101-12117 (Supp. 1992)); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112,
3§ 2-504, 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988)); the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988)); the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)); and the Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 274, 100 Stat. 3360 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 A & B (1986)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1990).
3. As of October 1994, a total of 36,604 ADA-related charges had been filed with the
EEOC. See BNA's Americans With Disabilities Act Manual, Dec. 1994, at 77.
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level, this most certainly will change in the very near future. The year
1994 will also be remembered as the year that the United States
Supreme Court finally resolved the issue of whether the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 is to be retroactively applied.4 By determining that the statute
is not retroactive, the Court restored certainty to an issue which had
spawned literally multitudes of conflicting decisions throughout the
United States. In another extremely important opinion, the High Court
also addressed the "after-acquired evidence" defense, placed considerable
limitations on the defense, and thereby reversed what had become a
substantial body of authority endorsing the doctrine.' Not to be
completely outdone, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit also handed down several significant decisions, especially in the
area of consent decrees and affirmative action plans," as well as the
parties' respective burdens of proof under the Equal Pay Act.7
I.
A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

Disparate Treatment Cases. Until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,' the analytical framework
in the typical disparate treatment case (i.e., those cases where there is
no direct evidence of discrimination), had been as constant as the North
Star. As provided in the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,9 and reaffirmed in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, ° the plaintiff bears the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination." If the plaintiff
satisfies this initial burden, then the defendant must meet the "exceed-

4. See discussion infra, Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994); Rivers
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
5. See discussion infra,McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995).

6. See discussion infra, Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 20 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir.
1994); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Emp. Lit., 20 F.3d 1525 (11th Cir. 1994);
United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497 (11th Cir. 1993); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). See discussion infra, Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc.
19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994); Meeks v. Computer Assoc. Intl, 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994).
8. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
9. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
10. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
11. 411 U.S. at 802; 450 U.S. at 252-53.
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ingly light" burden 2 of articulating "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for its employment decision.'8 It is at this stage of the inquiry
that the Supreme Court modified the analytical framework somewhat in
Hicks. Prior to Hicks, if the plaintiff could then establish that the
employer's profferred :reason was false, or pretextual, then a judgment
for the plaintiff was automatic. 4 However, in Hicks, the Court ruled
that, after the defendant meets its burden of production, the "McDonnell
Douglas framework-with its presumptions and burdens--is no longer
relevant."' 5 Instead, the Court continued, the "sole inquiry" at that
point becomes whether the plaintiff has established that the defendant
"intentionally
discriminated" against the plaintiff for an "impermissible
16
reason."
Although the Hicks standard has been criticized in some circles as
unduly favoring employers in the face of long-established precedent, the
Hicks standard was of no benefit to the employer in Batey v. Stone.1"
A race discrimination case alleging the discriminatory failure to promote,
the district court in Batey granted summary judgment for the employer,
the Anniston Army Depot ("ANAD"), located in Anniston, Alabama.'
Plaintiff, a white female, had worked as a civilian with the Army since
1958, and had worked her way up to Chief of the Production, Planning
& Control Division in supply, a GS-12 position she had obtained in
October, 1988. She was the first female to hold this position. The other
division chiefs within the supply unit were all males. The primary
litigation issue concerned the creation of a new position, Acting Director
of Supply, a GM-13 position. The creation of this new position allegedly
abolished the Deputy Director of Supply position. The new position was
awarded to a male, Fred Fomby, the Chief of General Supply, on the
theory that the new job description for the Acting Director position had
merged the job description of Chief of General Supply (Fomby's position)
with that of Deputy Director of Supply (the position allegedly abolished).' 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that a material issue
of fact remained as to whether the promotion decision had been
undertaken with discriminatory intent."° The court found that, on the

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983).
411 U.S. at 802; 450 U.S. at 253.
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792.
113 S. Ct. at 2749.
Id.
24 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1331-32.
Id. at 1333.
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basis of the evidence, it was unclear why the Deputy Director position
had been merged with General Supply (Fomby's position) rather than
Production, Planning & Control (plaintiff's position), since there was
evidence in the record that the Chief of Production, Planning & Control
was better suited for the new position.2 In short, the court found that
the evidence raised the question as. to whether the matrix utilized in
filling the new Acting Director position had been "fixed" to select a
predetermined candidate, and thereby favor the male (Fomby) over the
female (plaintiff).'
Summary judgment in favor of the employer did not fair any better
upon reaching the Eleventh Circuit in Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, NA. 2"
However, unlike Batey, the court focused its decision upon whether the
employer had adequately met its burden of production under the
Burdine framework.24 Plaintiff, a black male, had applied for a
position as a loan collector at defendant bank. The bank hired several
loan collectors, all of whom were white, and all of whom had less
collection experience than plaintiff. The bank maintained that it had a
policy requiring its employees to have "clear credit." However, no. credit
check was performed on plaintiff until after he had filed his discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). The credit check revealed that plaintiff had a poor history of
paying on a loan and also had overdrawn his checking account on
numerous occasions.2" The district court granted summary judgment
in the bank's favor on the basis of this evidence.26
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that defendant could
not rely on the credit history evidence to meet its burden of production,
since it had no knowledge of this information at the time it rejected
plaintiff's application.27 Even though the court acknowledged that the
employer's intermediate burden was one only of production, not
persuasion, the court found that this burden could not be met with a
"hypothetical justification for its decision."' Accordingly, the court
found that plaintiff's prima facie case stood unrebutted.' However, the
court remanded the case to resolve the issue of whether defendant could
meet its burden of establishing a Mt. Healthy defense, i.e., whether

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1335-36.
36 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1059-60.
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1062.
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defendant could show that it would not have hired plaintiff even absent
its discriminatory motive."°
The third typical disparate treatment case during the survey period,
Wilson v. AAA Plumbing Pottery Corp.,3 produced a very divided
opinion among the panel hearing the case. Plaintiff was a security
guard with AAA Plumbing Pottery Corp. Several years after plaintiff
was hired, AAA stopped employing security guards, and transferred
plaintiff to a full-time janitor position. In 1990, after working as a fulltime janitor for approximately five years, AAA fired plaintiff after
deciding to contract for its janitorial services. AAA then entered into a
one year contract with an African-American owned company to perform
its janitorial services after firing plaintiff. After terminating its relationship with the janitorial service, AAA then gave the janitorial job to one
of its own employees, a white female.3 2 Following a bench trial, the
district court found that defendant had not discriminated against
plaintiff in abolishing the full-time security guard and janitor position,
but found that AAA had discriminated against plaintiff on account of his
race by failing to offer him at least a part-time janitorial job at the same
rate of pay for which it could have contracted the services.' Key to the
court's decision was the fact that AAA had accommodated a white
supervisor by transferring him to the job of watchman when he could no
longer perform his supervisory duties for health reasons." On appeal,
the panel majority, in an opinion authored by Circuit Judge Hatchett,
found that the district court's decision was not clearly erroneous,"
assertedly applying the rule announced in Mitchell v. Worldwide
UnderwritersInsurance Co.36
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Edmondson reasoned that the
panel majority's opinion struck at the heart of a "core business decision";
that is, whether a business decides to "staff itself with full-time
30. Id. See, e4g., Joshi v. Florida State Univ. Health Ctr., 763 F.2d 1227, 1236 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). Interestingly, the court took the position that this
was not an after-acquired evidence case. 36 F.3d at 1062 n.9. However, it would appear
that the after-acquired evidence defense would be more applicable to this case than the Mt.
Healthy mixed-motive defense. As the Supreme Court clarified in McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Pub. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), discussed infra, the Mt. Healthy mixed-motive
defense, contrary to the after-acquired evidence defense, by definition, implies that the
employer had knowledge of the legitimate reasons justifying, in part, its employment
decision, at the time that the decision was made.
31. 34 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 1994).
32. Id. at 1026.
33. Id. at 1027.
34. Id.
35; Id. at 1029.
36. 967 F.2d 565 (11th Cir. 1992) (a reduction in force case under the ADEA).
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employees, part-time employees, independent contractors or some mix
.... 11 The dissent was critical of the district court and the panel
majority for seemingly requiring, as a matter of law, that the employer
create a new part-time janitor position as an accommodation to the
terminated employee.'
The dissent concluded that: "[tlhe district
court and this court seem to think that Title VII requires employers to
offer minority employees an opportunity to 'match' an outside independent contractor's price for the work, before the employer may contract
the job out lawfully. This law is new to me."'9 Clearly, the dissent
would have reversed the district court's judgment, a decision which the
authors wholeheartedly concur with.
Sexual Harassment. One case addressing the volatile issue of
sexual harassment reached the court of appeals during the survey
period. In Virgo v. Riviera Beach Associates, Ltd.,' plaintiff was
employed as the general manager of the Sheraton Ocean Inn, located on
the east coast of Florida, north of Miami. The Sheraton was owned by
Riviera Beach Associates, a limited partnership, and managed by
Sterling Group, who directly employed plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that
her superior, the president of Sterling Group, touched her sexually and
told her that she would have to engage in sexual intercourse with him
or else he would give her bad performance reviews. Plaintiff eventually
succumbed to this pressure and engaged in sexual intercourse with her
superior on four occasions.4 1 After resigning, plaintiff brought a Title
VII action for quid pro quo sexual harassment and also alleged several
common law tort claims.4 2 After a trial, the jury awarded plaintiff
$1,081,605 in damages and the district court subsequently awarded an
additional $420,670 in damages (including back pay and front pay).'

37. 34 F.3d at 1029 (Edmondson, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1030.
39. Id.
40. 30 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1994).
41. Id. at 1353-54.
42. Id. at 1354. In the typical quid pro quo sexual harassment case, the sexual
harassment is directly or indirectly tied to a tangible job condition (i.e., discharge, failure
to get a promotion, failure to get a raise) on the part of the affected employee. See, e.g.,
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1989). This is to be
distinguished from hostile environment sexual harassment which occurs when an
employer's conduct "'has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.'" Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(3)).
43. 30 F.3d at 1354.
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In affirming this decision on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered
a hodgepodge of issues raised by defendants." Initially, defendants
questioned the court's jurisdiction, asserting that neither Riviera Beach
nor Sterling Group had a sufficient number of employees to meet the
statutory definition of "employer." The district court found that the
two entities were joint employers, and that together they had employed
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
the requisite fifteen employees.'
found that the district court had correctly applied the joint employer test
utilized under the National Labor Relations Act, '7 as expressed in
NLRB v. Browning-FerrisIndustries.' Focusing on the management
agreement with Sterling Group, and the fact that, under the agreement,
Riviera Beach retained significant control over the day-to-day operation
of the hotel, including labor policies and decisions, the appellate court
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the joint employer
finding.49 Defendants also attacked on appeal the sufficiency of the
evidence for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Initially, the court
considered whether there was sufficient evidence to find Riviera Beach
liable for the conduct of Sterling Group's president, by again focusing on
the management agreement.' The appellate court determined that the
agreement clearly established Sterling Group as an agent of Riviera
Beach, and hence, liable for the actions of its agent's president.5 1 With
respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court had little trouble in
sustaining the jury's verdict, especially since the alleged sexual harasser52
had not even testified at the trial to rebut plaintiff's testimony.
Finally, the court affirmed as not clearly erroneous the district court's
factual finding that plaintiff was constructively discharged.'
Pregnancy Discrimination. Two cases during the survey period
addressed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA")," with opposite
results, and seemingly inconsistent conclusions. The first case, Byrd v.

44. Id. at 1364-65.
45. Id. at 1359.
46. Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
48. 30 F.3d at 1359 (citing NLRB v. Browing-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir.
1982)).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1360.
1362.
1362-63.
1363.

54. 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e(k) (1988).
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Lakeshore Hospital,' involved a receptionist/secretary who was
terminated by her employer, a hospital, during her pregnancy for
allegedly excessive absenteeism. Within approximately two months of
becoming pregnant, plaintiff missed ten scattered days of work because
of pregnancy-related illnesses and near-miscarriages. It was undisputed
that she had accumulated sufficient sick leave to cover the absences.'
After a bench trial, the district court ruled for defendant since plaintiff
had not established that non-pregnant workers with similar absentee
records were treated more favorably than plaintiff."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's findings
mandated a conclusion that the PDA had been violated as a matter of
law.' According to the court of appeals, the finding that plaintiff had
been discharged for using the hospital sick leave policy for her pregnancy-related condition, in and of itself, amounted to a finding of pregnancy
discrimination.59 The court reasoned that the "only logical inference"
that could be drawn was that the hospital customarily followed its own
policy60 Otherwise, according to the court, a presumption would result
that the hospital routinely discharged its employees for utilizing their
allotted sick leave time. 1 The court found that it was the employer's
burden to establish "this unusual scenario." 2 The court concluded that:
"[tihe effect of our decision today is simple: it is a violation of the PDA
for an employer to deny a pregnant employee the benefits commonly
afforded temporarily disabled workers in similar positions, or to
discharge a pregnant employee for using those benefits. "8
'
Approximately one month later, the Eleventh Circuit handed down
Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Inc." In that case, plaintiff worked as
a home health care nurse for a hospital in Dothan, Alabama. After
being assigned a patient who was HIV-positive, plaintiff, who was
pregnant, became very alarmed because she was afraid that the HIVpositive patient would put her fetus at risk. The hospital had a clearly
established policy that refusing to treat a patient constituted grounds for
termination. When plaintiff refused to treat the HIV-positive patient,
she was terminated (after declining the opportunity to resign). Prior to

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

30 F.3d 1380 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1380-81.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1383-84.
Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1383-84.
33 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1994).
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plaintiff's termination, another nurse (who was not pregnant) also had
been asked to resign because she had refused to treat an HIV-positive
patient.6 The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment.w
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered the case both under a
disparate treatment analysis and a disparate impact analysis. 7 Under
the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis, the court of appeals agreed
that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disparate
treatment, since she had failed to establish that the hospital's policy
(termination for refusing to treat a patient) was applied inconsistently
among the nurses." The court of appeals also agreed that no prima
facie case of disparate impact had been established since plaintiff failed
to establish that the hospital's policy disproportionately impacted
pregnant employees.' The evidence revealed that only two employees
had been terminated under the policy, one pregnant (plaintiff) and one
non-pregnant.70
Plaintiff also argued on appeal that the Supreme Court's decision in
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,7 1 required that an employer make
alternative work available for a pregnant employee who is concerned
about the health of her fetus. 2 Rejecting this contention, the court
concluded that Johnson Controls' prohibition on an employer deciding
what course of action is best for a pregnant employee does not include
a requirement that the employer make alternative work available."
The court emphasized that the legislative history of the PDA made it
clear that employers do not need to extend any benefits to pregnant
women that they do not already provide to other disabled employees.74
The court concluded: "While the PDA requires the employer to ignore
the pregnancy, the employer need not ignore absences, unless the
employer likewise ignores the absences of nonpregnant employees." 5

65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1309-11.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1312-18. The plaintiffs burden of proof in the typical disparate impact case

is provided in section 703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
68. 33 F.3d at 1314.
69. Id. at 1315.
70. Id.
71. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
72. 33 F.3d at 1316.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1317.

75. Id.
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This portion of the opinion is difficult to reconcile with Byrd.7'
Concluding that Title VII does not require employers to treat their
employees "with kindness," the court of appeals agreed that plaintiff had
not established a prima facie case of discrimination.77
Religious and National Origin Discrimination. In Beadle v.
Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department,78 the Eleventh Circuit was
confronted with an employer's duty under Title VII to reasonably
accommodate an employee's religious practices. Plaintiff, a SeventhDay Adventist, worked as a correctional officer for the Hillsborough
County prison. He was terminated when, after being scheduled to work
a Friday evening shift, he left his post early in order to observe his
sabbath (a period lasting from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday).'
The district court entered judgment in favor of the Sheriffs Department.81
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the employer had made
sufficient attempts to accommodate plaintiffs religious beliefs.8 2
Although the Sheriff's Department declined to grant plaintiff permanent
days off on his sabbath, it allowed him the freedom to arrange for shift
swaps with other employees, provided him with a roster sheet, and also
allowed him to advertise his need for swaps at roll call and on the
Department bulletin board.' While the court acknowledged that an
employer has a duty to accommodate an employee's religious practices,
it also noted that an employee has a duty to "make a good faith attempt
to accommodate his religious needs through means offered by the
employer.' s Since plaintiff failed to meet this duty by abandoning his
shift, the court affirmed the district court's decision.'
The issue of national origin discrimination under Title VII was
addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Green v. School Board of Hillsborough County." Plaintiff, a female of East Indian descent, was born and

76. Indeed, the cases appear to be in direct conflict on this point. Byrd appears to hold
that it is a violation of the PDA to discharge a pregnant employee for absenteeism,
regardless of the employer's practice with respect to nonpregnant employees.
77. 33 F.3d at 1317.
78. 29 F.3d 589 (Uth Cir. 1994).
79. Id. at 591.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id at 590.
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id at 593.
Id.
Id. at 593-94.
25 F.3d 974 (11th Cir. 1994).
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raised in Georgetown, Guyana, in South America. She was employed by
the defendant School Board as a substitute food service worker. Plaintiff
expressed an interest in being considered for a full-time food service
assistant position. Instead, the School Board selected another substitute, Ann Rodriguez. Upon learning of this decision, plaintiff confronted
her supervisor and engaged in a heated argument, during which her
supervisor allegedly referred to plaintiff as a "Cuban refugee. 7 The
district court denied defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' In a
bench trial of plaintiff's subsequent Title VII action, alleging that the
School Board failed to hire plaintiff for the full-time position because of
her national origin, the district court ruled that the School Board's
reasons for not hiring plaintiff were pretextual and in violation of Title
VII. However, plaintiff was only awarded one dollar in nominal
damages.8 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in
failing to grant the School Board's Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss.90 The
court concluded that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas since there was no evidence in the record to
establish the color or national origin of the individual (Ann Rodriguez)
selected over plaintiff for the full-time food service position. 91 Ironically, the only mention in the record of Rodriguez' nationality was during
closing argument when, in response to a question from the court,
defendant's counsel noted that Rodriguez was white, had married
someone named Rodriguez, and that she was "sort of an American Heinz
57, not a Hispanic by any measure."92 However, the court found that
this statement could not be relied upon by plaintiff as evidence.93
B. Proceduraland Evidentiary Matters
Class Actions. Title VII class actions are on the verge of following
the same path as that which befell the dinosaur; that is, total extinction,
and significant only for historians to debate and discuss. A few vestiges
of this past era remain. One such vestige is the Eleventh Circuit's

87. Id. at 976.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 977.
at 980.
at 978.
at 979.
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decision in Griffin v. Singletary," which began as an "across-the-board"
Title VII class action against the Florida Department of Corrections in
1979. At issue in the most recent appeal to the Eleventh Circuit was the
application of the so-called "piggyback rule."95 This rule allows class
members to assert a claim in a Title VII class action despite not having
exhausted their administrative remedy before the EEOC, as long as a
representative class member has filed a timely charge and obtained the
In this sense, the non-filing class
statutory notice of right-to-sue.
members are allowed to "piggyback" onto the charge filed by the class
representative. In an earlier decision, the Eleventh Circuit had vacated
the district court order certifying the original class. Thereafter, some
of the members of the original class filed a second class action, challenging defendant's requirement that all applicants pass a written examination as a condition of being hired." The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that no plaintiff had filed a
timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 9
On appeal, the principal issue was whether the latest group of
plaintiffs could take advantage of the EEOC charge filed by the class
representative in the original Griffin class (that subsequently was
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that they could piggyback
vacated)."
their individual claims, but not any class claims." 1 As for the class
claims, the court found that plaintiffs could not "piggyback one class
action onto another," resulting in "endless rounds of litigation... over
the adequacy of successive named plaintiffs to serve as class representatives."102 The court noted that the Griffin litigation had been pending
for fifteen years, and the court had no intention of making a ruling that
would prolong it "even further."1" As for plaintiffs' individual claims,
however, the court found that the piggyback rule did apply as long as
the prior class action was pending.10" Since defendants had been put
on notice during the prior action that their written examination was
being challenged, the court found that the charge-filing period for the
new plaintiffs was tolled from the time that the original Griffin action

94.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

17 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994).

Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 358. See Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1494 (11th Cir. 1987).
17 F.3d at 358-59.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 360-61.
Id. at 359 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 360.
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was filed until the time of the Eleventh Circuit's prior opinion vacating
0 5 The court remanded the action for a
the class certification order."
determination of whether, in light of the court's opinion, the individual
plaintiffs had filed timely charges.'
Pre-Suit Arbitration. In Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 0 7 the Eleventh Circuit rendered an additional endorsement for
Gilmerlk-style arbitration. Plaintiffs were former securities sales
agents with Equitable. Both had signed applications with the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). Plaintiffs brought an action
under Title VII alleging discrimination on account of race in various
respects.1c9 The district court denied defendant's motion to compel
arbitration."'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, broadly
interpreting the arbitration clause in the NASD Code, and reiterating
the federal policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving employment disputes."'
Administrative Prerequisites to Suit. Two cases during the
survey period addressed the administrative prerequisites that a plaintiff
must meet prior to bringing an action under Title VII. The more
significant of the two cases, Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan,"2 has the
potential to all but eliminate the administrative exhaustion requirement.
Shortly after his discharge by defendant, plaintiff filed a charge with the
EEOC alleging discrimination on account of race and retaliation in
violation of Title VII. Contemporaneously, plaintiff requested that the
EEOC issue a right-to-sue notice. Eleven days after the filing of the
charge, the District Director of the EEOC issued the right-to-sue notice,
certifying that his office could not complete its processing of the charge
within 180 days." 3 The district court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the EEOC had exclusive jurisdiction
during the
4
180 day period following the filing of the charge.1

105. Id. at 361.
106. Id.
107. 32 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1994).

108. Ironically, even though this case is a clear endorsement of Gilmer-style arbitration
in the employment context, there is no mention of the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer

v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) in the court's opinion.
109. 32 F.3d at 517-18.
110. Id. at 518.
111. Id. at 520.
112.

22 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1994).

113. Id. at 1060.
114. Id.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in
viewing the administrative prerequisites as jurisdictional requirements,
reiterating its past holdings that the prerequisites, instead, should be
viewed as conditions precedent."' With respect to the early issuance
of the right-to-sue notice, the court followed the decisions from the
Second"' and Ninth Circuits" 7 in ruling that the notices had been
properly issued." 8 The court noted that there was nothing on the face
of the statute which prohibited the Commission from issuing right-to-sue
notices before the expiration of 180 days, and further commented that
it was "pointless" for plaintiff to have to "stand by and mark time until
the 180-day period expires.""' Although the court concluded with a
statement that its decision was not allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the
administrative exhaustion requirement, 120 that result appears to be
precisely what this opinion allows.
In the second administrative prerequisite case, Thomas v. Kroger
Co. , 121 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the long-established principle
that a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC before filing a Title
VII action. 122 Since it was undisputed that plaintiff had never filed a
charge, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in
favor of defendant."2
Accordingly, although the administrative
exhaustion requirement may be a meaningless jesture in most cases in
light of Sims, the Eleventh Circuit still will not allow a plaintiff to
ignore the requirement altogether.

115. Id. at 1063. See also Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, 713 F.2d 1518,
1524 (11th Cir. 1983); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1010 (11th Cir.
1982).
116. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
117. See Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726
(9th Cir. 1984), cert.denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985); Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., 644
F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1981).
118. 22 F.3d at 1061.
119. Id. The conclusion that Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII does not prohibit the issuance
of a right-to-sue notice before the expiration of 180 days is contrary to the interpretation
of the statute by other courts. See, e.g., Henschke v. New York Hosp.-Cornell Medical Ctr.,
821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). However, early issuance of the right-to-sue notice is also
allowed pursuant to the EEOC's procedural regulations. See 29 CFR § 1601.28(aX2).
120. 22 F.3d at 1063.
121. 24 F.3d 147 (11th Cir. 1994).
122. Id. at 149-50.
123. Id.
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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT

A-

Coverage Under the Act
Only four significant Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
cases were reported during the survey period. Each case was decided on
summary judgment. However, the court reversed each case on appeal,
indicating the increasing difficulty district courts are having successfully
applying summary judgment in age discrimination cases.
Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc. "2 concerned the scope of the term
"employee" for coverage purposes under the ADEA. The appellate court
focused on the proper test for determining who qualifies as an "employee" (as opposed to an independent contractor) for ADEA purposes.'
Honeywell employed Daughtrey pursuant to a consultant agreement
to perform computer programming services in exchange for an hourly
wage.126 Under the terms of the consulting agreement, Daughtrey was
labelled "an independent contractor."127
The agreement further
provided that she "shall be free to exercise discretion and independent
judgment as to the methods and means of performance of the services
connected with the assignments made" to her by Honeywell." 2
According to the agreement, Daughtrey was not an employee of
Honeywell and was not entitled to any of the usual benefits and
privileges of employment with Honeywell." Additionally, during the
latter years of the relationship, a separate company served as "paymaster" for Honeywell with respect to its consultant workers, such as
Daughtrey. 30 Daughtrey, however, previously had been a regular
Honeywell employee for several years prior to entering into the
consulting relationship.'
Following a layoff, she entered the purported consulting relationship with her former employer. 3 2 Daughtrey
served as a consultant to Honeywell from 1986 until January 29, 1988,
when she, along with ten to eleven other consultants, were terminated.'
Thereafter, she initiated an action against Honeywell inter alia

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

3 F.3d 1488 (11th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1492.
Id. at 1490.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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under the ADEA.3 4 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Honeywell and against Daughtrey on her ADEA claim,
concluding that, under the agreement, she was an independent
contractor and as such could not maintain an employment discrimination
action under the Act.1" 6 The district court correctly reasoned that an
independent contractor was not entitled to maintain a claim under the
ADEA because the Act only prohibits age discrimination by an "employer."136 Since Honeywell qualified as a contractor, not an employer of
the plaintiff, no relief was available to her under the Act.1" 7 However,
the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings upon finding that the district court failed to undertake a
thorough analysis of all the factors relevant to this determination.3 8s
The court of appeals noted that the federal circuits generally have
adopted a hybrid approach to distinguish between an "employee" and an
"independent contractor" for a variety of anti-discrimination purposes. "39
' However, at least one federal circuit questioned the continued
vitality of the hybrid approach in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden.4 ' In light of Darden,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the traditional
agency test must be applied in the ADEA context. 4 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, declined to decide which test to apply in ADEA
cases.'42 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit in Daughtrey concluded that,
under either test, the question presented is a factual one, not appropriate for disposition on summary judgment. 4 3 Upon examination of the
facts in Daughtrey, the appellate court determined that a disputed issue
of fact existed regarding the degree of control exercised by Honeywell
over the manner in which Daughtrey performed her services according

134. Id. at 1490-91.
135. Id. at 1491.
136. Id. The ADEA defines "employee" as "an individual employed by any employer'
and provides no guidance as to the scope of this term. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
137. 3 F.3d at 1495. The ADEA does not provide relief for discrimination against an
independent contractor. See, e.g., Oestman v. National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d
303 (10th Cir. 1992); Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v.
Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).

138. 3 F.3d at 1496.
139. Id. at 1495.
140. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). Absent legislative guidance within federal discrimination
laws, the courts have applied tests developed for different purposes to the employeeindependent contractor determination in the employment discrimination context. See infra,
3 F.3d at 1495-96.
141. 3 F.3d at 1495-96 (citing Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993)).
142. Id. at 1496.
143. Id.
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to the consulting agreement.'" Therefore, the court remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to determine Honeywell's
authority over the manner and means by which Daughtrey discharged
her duties under the consultant agreement.14
Unfortunately, the opinion in Daughtrey did not resolve the issue of
which is the proper test in the Eleventh Circuit-the agency or hybrid
analysis. The decision provides the district courts with little guidance
when analyzing whether an individual qualifies as an "employee" or an
"independent contractor." This distinction is important since the ADEA
does not provide relief for discrimination against an independent
47
contractor. 146 The Supreme Court in Darden1
stated that the traditional common law analysis should be undertaken. However, the
Eleventh Circuit has adopted the hybrid approach.'
"The hybrid
approach ...

adheres to the common law test, tempered by a consider-

ation of the 'economic realities' of the hired party's dependence on the
hiring party."49 It, therefore, remains unclear how the district court
should proceed on remand and it is entirely possible that Daughtrey will
have to make yet another trip back up on appeal concerning this
question.
B. Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
Retaliation. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 5
concerned retaliation for filing an ADEA charge. The court of appeals
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, finding that
Hairston had set forth a prima facie case of retaliation discrimination
sufficient to withstand summary judgment.'5 1
Hairston worked for a number of years as manager of the sports
department at the Gainesville Sun newspaper. 52 In February 1987,
the newspaper hired a new publisher and made other changes in

144. Id.
145. Id.
146.

See supra note 137.

147. 112 S. Ct. at 1346. At least in the view of the Second Circuit, Darden requires
that the common law definition of "employee" govern the scope of the ADEA as well as
ERISA. 986 F.2d at 90.
148. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340-41 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
874 (1982).
149, 3 F.3d at 1495 (citation omitted).
150. 9 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 1993).
151. Id. at 920.
152. Id. at 916.
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management. 153 Hairston apparently fell from grace with -the newspaper's new editorial staff and, as a result, his duties pertaining to
management of the sports department were reduced and subsequently
assigned to a much younger employee.'" Hairston also began receiving critical reviews and marginal performance evaluations for the first
time in his career after the change in management.'5 5 He began to
suspect that his low appraisals were age discrimination rather than fair
evaluations of his job performance and he began to articulate his
5 6 On October 27, 1989, he filed an age
suspicions in this regard."
the newspaper. 1 7
against
discrimination charge
Around the same time, Hairston began reporting on a National
Collegiate Athletic Association investigation of the University of Florida
basketball program. 5 ' During the course of coverage of that investigation, Hairston solicited support from then Florida Basketball Coach
Norm Sloan concerning his age discrimination complaint against the
newspaper." 9 Upon learning of these activities by Hairston, the
newspaper took further disciplinary action against him in the belief that
his conduct violated journalistic ethics and created a conflict of
interest."4 Although Hairston disagreed, he was suspended without
Subsequent to
pay for thirty days as a result of this controversy.'
the suspension, Hairston was discharged from employment with the
newspaper for another incident of alleged misconduct and this law suit
ensued."6 2
The district court granted summary judgment for the newspaper after
reviewing the facts of the case and determined that Hairston failed to
establish a prima facie case of either retaliatory suspension or retaliato-

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 917. Hairston claimed that he had been "functionally demoted, harassed
and denied wage increases because of his age." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. It is unclear what relevant input Coach Sloan may have had on this subject.
160. Id.
161. Id. Hairston thereafter filed a new charge of age discrimination. He alleged that
his suspension was retaliation for his having filed his original charges of age discrimination. Id.
162. Id. at 918. The termination incident involved another act of perceived
insubordination concerning Hairston's reporting of interviews with Louisana State
University basketball coach Dale Brown, who had also agree to testify on Hairston's behalf
with respect to his age discrimination claims. Id. at 917-18. Again, it is unclear from the
record what relevant information Coach Brown possessed on this subject.
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The court of appeals reversed and found that the
ry discharge.'
district court had improperly allocated the respective burdens of the
parties in the summary judgment context and that Hairston had indeed
established both prima facie cases sufficient to withstand summary judgment.'1"
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court finding that
Hairston failed to satisfy the third prong of the Doyal v. Marsh'6 5 test
requiring a "causal link" between his protected statements and the
adverse employment actions taken against him.'66 The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that the strict proof of causation required under Doyal
v. Marsh does not properly apply at the summary judgment phase of
litigation. 7 Instructing that the Doyal standard is more appropriately applied at the trial phase, the court of appeals held that a plaintiff's
burden of establishing a causal link sufficient to survive a motion for
summary judgment is less exacting than that required by Doyal to
withstand a motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's
case.' At the summary judgment phase, the court must review all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all
inferences in his favor.6 9 Consequently, for summary judgment
purposes, according to this panel, mere knowledge of an employer that
protected activity has occurred is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case for a retaliation claim, if adverse action thereafter follows. 7

Discharge. In Corbin v. Southland International Trucks,'7 ' the
Eleventh Circuit again reversed the district court's grant of summary

163. Id.
164. Id. at 921. Burden shifting represents a substantial problem for the district courts
on appeal.
165. 777 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985).
166. 9 F.3d at 920. There was no dispute on appeal that Hairston had satisfied the
first two elements of both his retaliatory suspension and retaliatory discharge claims. The
district court found troublesome the causal link between protected statements and adverse
employment actions. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 918. See Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992);
Rollins v. TechSOUTH, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987).
170. 9 F.3d at 920.
[Tihis Court finds that the record, at the very least, establishes that Appellee was
aware of Appellants protected activities at the time the adverse employment
action took place. This Court further finds that the record may support the
proposition that the protected expression and the adverse employment actions
were not wholly unrelated.

Id,
171.

25 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994).
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judgment in an ADEA case.172 Corbin was a fifty-eight-year old
mechanic who had been employed by Southland for approximately five
years at the time of his discharge.'73 He was terminated, according to
his employer, because of his uncooperative attitude regarding the
implementation of a new production system. 74 Corbin contended that
the proffered reason for his termination was actually a pretext for age
discrimination. 7 ' The district court concluded that Corbin failed to
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because of his lack of
proof that he had been replaced by someone younger and the reason
offered by his employer for his termination was a pretext for age
discrimination.7 " On review, the court of appeals concluded that
Corbin had presented sufficient evidence below to rebut the inference
that he had been discharged because of his poor attitude.'77 He
established a prima facie case, the court explained, by merely showing
that he had been replaced by someone five years younger than him, thus
creating a sufficient factual question to withstand summary judg78
ment.1
This case illustrates the increasing trend toward rewriting the prima
facie case requirements in ADEA actions. It is no longer a requirement
for a prima facie case to show that a protected employee was replaced by
someone outside the protected age group.' 79 It is now sufficient, at
least for summary judgment purposes, to simply show that the protected
employee was replaced by someone younger, even though that younger
person may also be a member of the protected age group." °

172. Id. at 1546-47.
173. Id. at 1547.
174. Id. During a series of meetings with the supervisor concerning the group
production system, the supervisor noted that Corbin had a "general bad attitude towards
management and the work place .... " Id.
175. Id. at 1546.
176. Id. at 1548.
177. Id. at 1549.
178. Id. at 1550.
179. See, e.g., Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991).
180. 25 F.3d at 1549. See Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 583 (11th Cir. 1989)
(49-year old plaintiff whose replacement was 46 years old established prima facie case of
age discrimination); Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1444 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985) (60-year old plaintiff whose replacement was 46
years old established prima facie case of age discrimination). "Unlike race discrimination
cases where membership within a protected group is measured dichotomously, membership
is a matter of degree with age discrimination." Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d
1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990).
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C. ProceduralMatters
Timely Charge. Another ADEA summary judgment was reversed
Sturniolo presented the court
in Sturniolo v. Sheaffer, Eaton, Inc.'
with a tolling issue. 2 The court of appeals determined that the 180day period for filing an ADEA charge should be equitably tolled under
the particular facts of this case. 183 Sturniolo's employment was
terminated in October 1990 as part of a reduction in force and reorganization of Sheaffer, Eaton's regional sales force.' At the time of his
layoff, plaintiff was told that his former position was to be abolished.'
Some months later, Sturniolo learned that Sheaffer hired a younger
person to perform essentially the same regional sales job previously
He thereafter initiated a claim of age
occupied by Sturniolo s
discrimination.'
The district court granted summary judgment for
Sheaffer, Eaton, finding that Sterniolo had failed to file his administrative charge of age discrimination within the 180 day period as required
Since he failed to file an administrative charge
under the Act.'
within the time limitation, his civil action could not be entertained by
the court.'
According to the district court, Sterniolo had 180 days
from the date he first learned of his impending termination within which
to file his administrative charge and as such, his lawsuit was untimely.' ° Sterniolo contended that he missed this deadline because he did
not learn until later of the existence of his younger replacement and at
that point he had reason to suspect that he had been the victim of
unlawful age discrimination.""' The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Sturniolo did not have any reason to doubt the reasons for his

181. 15 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 1994).
182. Tolling is an equitable concept whereby a claimant's delay in filing an administrative charge of discrmination is excused. Most courts have held that the administrative
charge filing requirement is akin to a statute of limitations which can be tolled for
equitable reasons. See Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 595 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc). The charge filing period for an ADEA charge is subject to equitable
modification. Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987).
183. 15 F.3d at 1026.
184. Id. at 1025.
185. Id.
186. Id. An individual employed by Sheaffer, Eaton apparently began representing
herself as Sturniolo's replacement in December 1990 or early 1991. Id.
187. Id. at 1024.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1025-26.
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termination until several months thereafter when he confirmed that a
younger individual had been hired to replace him. 9 2
The court of appeals concluded that it was not apparent to Sturniolo
that he had been the victim of age discrimination until he learned of this
fact in late 1990 or early 1991."' Consequently, the court reasoned,
the 180-day period did not begin running until he received that information."9 4 The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the court of appeals' decision.19
III.

REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA

A.

Consent Decrees and Affirmative Action Plans
Consent decree litigation seems to have a life of its own. Four cases
during the survey period addressed this very complex and troublesome
area: two cases involving consent decrees and affirmative action plans
adopted for the City of Birmingham, and two additional cases involving
similar plans adopted for the City of Miami. The Birmingham litigation
was the oldest of the group, having originated over twenty years ago, but
the Miami litigation was not far behind, having begun over fifteen years
ago.
The first Birmingham case, Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P v. Seibels,' 9
involved proceedings to modify two consent decrees which had been
negotiated a number of years ago to remedy perceived discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices for the City of Birmingham and various
related agencies. Both the United States and a group of male, non-black
city employees moved to modify the decrees in various respects, and both
were appealing the district court's decision, contending that the lower
court did not go far enough in modifying the decrees. The Eleventh
Circuit agreed that the decrees were unconstitutional, as to both the race
and gender classifications, and remanded the action for additional
potential modifications consistent with the opinion. 97
Applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the race-conscious provisions of
the decree, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in City
of Richmond v. J.A Croson Co.,1 mandated the finding that parts of

192. Id. at 1026.
193. Id.

194. Id. (relying upon Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876 (5th Cir), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991)).
195. Id.
196. 20 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994).
197. Id. at 1493.

198. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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the decree were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
With respect to Croson's"compelling government interest requirement,"
the court concluded that there needed to be a "strong basis in evidence"
that past racially discriminatory practices had occurred and that
affirmative action was required as a remedy.'" Although the court
agreed that such strong evidence had been demonstrated with respect to
the City's police and fire departments, no such showing, according to the
court, had been made as to any other City departments. On remand, the
district court was instructed to make appropriate findings as to these
other departments, and if the requisite strong evidence of discrimination
could not be established, the district court was instructed to "forthwith
terminate" the affirmative action provision for these departments."0
The court of appeals also found the consent decrees lacking with
respect to the second Croson requirement that the affirmative action
relief be "narrowly tailored" to serve the compelling interest in ending
discrimination.2"' The court found that both the long-term goals and
the annual goals set forth in the decrees were "fundamentally flawed,"
in that they were designed to create "parity" between the "racial
composition of the labor pool" and the racial composition of each job
position. 2 According to the court, the Constitution does not guarantee
racial parity; it only forbids racial discrimination. The court of appeals
was also troubled by the fact that the decrees allowed the City to
indefinitely continue its racially discriminatory selection procedures, and
then cure the resulting discriminatory impact with "race-conscious
affirmative action."2' 3 The court mandated that such "institutionized
The court of appeals
discrimination" should not be tolerated.'
concluded:
We cannot allow stop-gap remedies to turn into permanent palliatives.
Therefore, the district court is directed to order the City and the Board
to develop race-neutral selection procedures forthwith, not at the
casual pace the Board has passed off as progress for thirteen years.
The Board's decree is not a security blanket to be clung to, but a badge

of shame, a monument to the Board's past and present failure to treat
all candidates in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.

199. 20 F.3d at 1505.

200. Id. at 1509.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1510-11.

203. Id. at 1512.
204. Id.

Federal
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judicial oversight should provide public employers no refuge from their
responsibilities.'
Employing an "intermediate scrutiny" analysis, the court reached a
similar result with respect to the gender-conscious provisions of the
decrees. Accordingly, the court remanded the consent decrees to the
district court for further modifications consistent with the appellate
court's decision.
Closely related to the Ensley Branch litigation is In re Birmingham
Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation.2'
This case also
addressed a consent decree for the City of Birmingham, but was more
narrowly focused, addressing the decree governing promotions within the
City's Fire Department."c7 Plaintiffs comprised a group of non-black
male firefighters who brought suit against the City challenging the
consent decree under both Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause.2' The district court, despite having already experienced an
Eleventh Circuit remand as to the same decree in a prior opinion,2"
ruled that the consent decree violated neither Title VII nor the Equal
Protection Clause.21
On this latest trip to the court of appeals, the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed on both counts.211 With respect to Title VII, the court
analyzed the decree under the two part test established by the Supreme
Court in Johnson v. TransportationAgency." The first prong of the
Johnson test asks whether the affirmative action requirements of the
plan are justified by the manifest racial imbalance in the job category in
question, and the second prong asks whether the remedial provisions of
the decree unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-black employees.2 3
Although the court agreed that there was a sufficient showing of a
manifest imbalance in the job category in question (fire lieutenant), the
court also found that the plan unnecessarily trammeled the rights of
non-black firefighters.214

The court reached this conclusion because

the decree arbitrarily selected a fifty percent promotion quota mandating
that fifty percent of the promotions to fire lieutenant for an indefinite

205. Id. at 1518.
206. 20 F.3d 1525 (11th Cir. 1994).
207.
208.

Id. at 1530-31.
Id. at 1530.

209. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Emp. Lit., 833 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.
1987), affd sub norn., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
210. 20 F.3d at 1534.
211. Id. at 1549-50.
212. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
213.

20 F.3d at 1537.

214. Id. at 1540-41.
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period of time had to be black.21 5 The court stated that: "[in our
view, the City decree fails under Title VII because the indefinitelylasting, arbitrarily-selected fifty percent figure for annual black
promotions to fire lieutenant unnecessarily trammels the rights of nonblack firefighters by unduly restricting their promotional opportunities
through establishment of an arbitrary fixed quota."26 The court
applied a strict scrutiny analysis in reaching a similar result with
respect to the decrees under the Equal Protection Clause.217 The court,
while acknowledging that there was a compelling governmental interest
in ending the prior discriminatory practices within the Fire Department,
nonetheless found that the City's rigid fifty percent promotion quota was
not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination.218 According to
the court, the City's approach, "while administratively convenient,"
amounted to nothing more than "perpetuation of discrimination by
government."219 The action was remanded for "appropriate relief'
consistent with the court's opinion.'
Similarily, a consent decree governing promotions within the Fire
Department was at issue before the court in United States v. City of
Miami. 21 This decree was entered into over fifteen years ago, with the
purpose of ending the effects of past discriminatory practices on the
basis of sex, race, and ethnic origin within the City of Miami's Fire
Department. This latest proceeding began when the International
Association of Firefighters, Local 587, on behalf of its members, filed a
motion to dissolve or modify the decree, alleging that it had served its
purpose.22 2 The district court denied the Union's motion.22 In light
of the Supreme Court's intervening decisions in Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail224 and Board of Education v. Dowell,225 the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's decision, and remanded the case
for reconsideration. 26 Although the consent decrees at issue in these
cases involved unconstitutional jail conditions and desegregation of a
school district, respectively, the Eleventh Circuit held that the principles

215.
216,
217.
218.
219.
220.
221,
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1542.
Id.
Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1545.
Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1550.
2 F.3d 1497 (11th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1499-1502.
Id. at 1502.
502 U.S. 367 (1992).
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
2 F.3d at 1503-05 (citing Rufo, 502 U.S. 367; DoweU, 498 U.S. 237).
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in these cases are applicable to requests to modify or terminate consent
decrees in the employment discrimination context. 7 On remand, the
court directed the district court to determine whether the decree's "basic
purpose" (defined as eliminating the effects of past discrimination, as
opposed to achieving workforce parity) had been achieved.'
If so,
according to the court of appeals, the consent decree was to be terminated.'
Even if the decree was not terminated, the court also directed
the district court to examine the decree's promotion goals, and consider
modification of the goals, if necessary' ° In reviewing the goals, the
court of appeals found that the proper way to determine whether a
workforce imbalance existed was to compare the minority workforce of
the position in question to the "qualified minority population in the
relevant labor market."2 '
An affirmative action plan in yet another fire department was before
the court in Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County. 2 Plaintiff brought
an individual reverse discrimination claim, attacking Metro Dade's
affirmative action plan under both Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause. Plaintiff had applied for an entry level firefighter position. As
part of the application process, he took the firefighter examination, and
earned a score that ranked him number 28 out of 2,188 persons passing
the test. However, several miniorities who scored lower than plaintiff
on the exam, were hired instead of plaintiff pursuant to the affirmative
action plan.'
In an earlier appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding that the plan did not violate Title VI. 4
However, the case had been remanded for reconsideration of the
constitutional claim in light of the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.?5 On remand, the district court upheld
the plan a second time, even under Croson's strict scrutiny analysis.'
On its second trip to the court of appeals, the plan was upheld once
again, this time under the Equal Protection Clause. 7 The court
initially had little trouble in agreeing that the County demonstrated a

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 1505.
Id. at 1508.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1509 (emphasis added).
26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1548.
See Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade Co., 940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 1073 (1992).
235. 940 F.2d at 1411 (citing Croson, 480 U.S. at 469).
236. 26 F.3d at 1552.
237. Id.
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compelling state interest in ending past discrimination.'
Indeed, the
County presented evidence from a statistics expert establishing that the
difference between the expected and actual percentage of Hispanics
within the Fire Department, in comparison to the relevant labor market
(determined in this case to be the general population between the ages
of eighteen and fifty-five within the geographic boundaries of Dade
County) was 17.6 standard deviations. 2' 9 According to the expert
testimony, there was only one chance in one billion cases that this
disparity would have occurred by chance, and this evidence was totally
unrebutted. 2
The court also found that the plan was sufficiently
narrowly tailored to accomplish its remedial purpose. 2" Contrary to
the Birmingham plan discussed above, the court found that the goals
under the Metro Dade plan were sufficiently flexible, instead of "fixed
quotas", and that the plan was of limited duration (including a provision
that it would terminate when it achieved its seventy percent hiring
goal).' 2 Accordingly, the court of appeals agreed that Metro Dade's
affirmative action plan passed constitutional muster.'
B.

Attorney Fees
In Cullens v. Georgia Department of Transportation,2 " the Eleventh
Circuit considered the proper calculation of an attorney fees award in an
employment discrimination suit pursuant to Section 706(k) of Title
L "
VII.
In the underlying action alleging racial discrimination in
hiring, promotions, and job assignments, plaintiffs prevailed to a limited
extent on their individual claims, but were denied relief altogether with
respect to their class claims. Assertedly employing the "lodestar"
method of computing fees as provided in Hensley v. Eckerhart,'46 the
district had awarded attorney fees in the amount of $36,471.'
The
lower court arrived at this figure by computing an initial lodestar of
$57,307, determined by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate in the
area where the case was filed-found to be $100 per hour-times the
reasonable number of hours spent on the litigation-found to be 573.045

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 1557.
Id. at 1556.
Id.
Id. at 1559.
Id.
Id. at 1562.
29 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1491.
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
29 F.3d at 1491.
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hours.248 The district court then reduced the lodestar to $12,157,
determined by calculating the "present value of plaintiffs' recovery," and
then "trebling this figure" to arrive at $36,471. 249 Without expressing
an opinion as to whether the amount of fees calculated by the district
court was erroneous, the Eleventh Circuit nonetheless disapproved of the
lower court's method of calculation." 0 The court rejected the "proportionality of damages" as a proper basis for the award, as well as the use
of a multiplier. 1 Characterizing the district court's method as a "cash
register approach," the appellate court remanded the case for a
recalculation
of the fees award "stripped of proportionality of damages
252
to award."
After-Acquired Evidence
In Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.," the Eleventh Circuit set the
stage for a major decision on the after-acquired evidence doctrine, by
vacating its prior panel decision' and by deciding to rehear the case
en banc. 255 However, the Supreme Court, not to be surpassed, stole
the Eleventh Circuit's thunder with its decision in McKennon v.
Nashville BannerPublishingCo.2 6 In a unanimous opinion, the Court
ruled that after-acquired evidence could not be utilized to avoid liability
altogether in an action under the ADEA.257 In so ruling, the Court
expressly overruled the Tenth Circuit's decision in Summers v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"8 and a considerable body of
case law developed following Summers.259 However, in a ruling very
close to the Eleventh Circuit's prior panel decision in Wallace, the Court
also ruled that after-acquired evidence could have a direct bearing on a
plaintiff's remedy.' 0 The Court concluded that, as a general rule,
C.

248. Id. at 1492.

249. Id.
250. Id. at 1492-93.
251. Id. at 1492.
252. Id. at 1493-94.
253. 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
254. See Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
255. 32 F.3d at 1490.
256. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
257. Id. at 886.
258. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
259. See, e.g., Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994); Washington v. Lake County, 969
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992);
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832
(1984).
260, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
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neither reinstatement nor front pay would be appropriate remedies
where after-acquired evidence is established."' The Court also ruled
that such evidence could be utilized to cut off back pay from the date of
discovery of the after-acquired evidence. ' 2 Finally, the Court adopted
the following rule as to what constitutes after-acquired evidence: "[Aln
employer ...

must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such

severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those
grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the
discharge."2" Accordingly, after McKennon, the after-acquired evidence defense still exists, and still can be utilized to broaden a defendant's scope of inquiry in discovery, but the defense also has been
severely limited.
IV.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

A.

Retroactivity
In a trilogy of decisions, the United States Supreme Court settled the
various retroactivity questions created by unclear drafting in the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.2' 4 As a result of the
confusion created by the passage of the 1991 Act, civil actions have been
clogging the district and circuit courts since the act became law.265
Final passage of the Act was a textbook example of poor drafting and the
uncertainties of relying upon legislative history to attempt to discern
Congressional intent.266

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 886-87.
264. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1826
(1994).
265. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is in large part a response to a series of decisions by
the Supreme Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964. Section 3(4)
expressly identifies as one of the Act's purposes "to respond to recent decisions of the
Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination." The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 and scattered
sections (Supp. 1992)).
266. The Court granted certiorari in Landgraf in order to decide the question of
whether Section 102 of the 1991 Act applies to cases pending when it became law. "Thus,
the controlling question is whether the Court of Appeals should have applied the law in
effect at the time the discriminatory conduct occurred, or at the time of its decision in July
1992." 114 S. Ct. at 1489. In Rivers the Court granted certiorari to decide whether Section
101 of the Act applies to a case that arose before it was enacted. 114 S. Ct. at 1513. The
Court was forced to deal with these questions because the 1991 Act did not provide clear
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In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 7 and its companion decision,
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,2' the Court concluded that the
provisions of the 1991 Act do not apply to Title VII or Section 1981 cases
which were pending on appeal when the Act became law.269 The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 created a right to compensatory and punitive
damages for certain Title VII violations and the right to jury trial in the
event such damages are soughtY Other provisions of the 1991 Act
broadened the scope of Section 1981 causes of action. 1 These companion decisions, Landgraf and Rivers, determined that the expanded
remedies and scope of actions are not available in cases pending upon
the date of enactment of the 1991 ActY 2 The Court reached this
conclusion notwithstanding language within the Act which stated that
it was to become effective "upon enactment."2 73 The Court found this
"upon enactment" language to be not particularly helpful in resolving the
retroactivity question. 4 Instead, it was forced to undertake an
exhaustive analysis of the canons of statutory construction and
concluded that the presumption against retroactive legislation had not
been rebutted with respect to the 1991 Act. 275
In McKnight v. GeneralMotors Corp.,27' decided one month later, the
Court held that an attorney may not be sanctioned for appealing the
dismissal of his client's employment discrimination action pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of the retroactivity issue created by the
Act. 277 In McKnight there was controlling circuit precedent on the
issue of retroactivity of the 1991 Act. 278 The Seventh Circuit maintained that the relevant provisions were not to be given retroactive

Congressional intent with respect to the question of its effective date and its impact on
cases pending upon its effective date. In 1990 a similar civil rights bill passed both houses,
but was vetoed by President Bush, in part because of the bill's "unfair retroactivity rules."
See 136 Cong. Rec. 5165589 (Oct. 24, 1990). There was no similar language concerning
retroactivity in the 1991 Act; causing considerable confusion within thejudicary and among
practitioners as to the proper application of expanded provisions and remedies available
under the 1991 Act once it was passed.
267. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
268. 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
269. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1508.
270. 114 S. Ct. at 1491.
271. See 114 S. Ct. at 1489-91.
272. 114 S. Ct. at 1506; 114 S. Ct. at 1519.
273. 114 S. Ct. at 1493 (quoting § 402(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1994).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1494-96.
276. 114 S. Ct. 1826 (1994).
277. Id. at 1826.
278. Id.
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effect. 279 Plaintiff's counsel nonetheless perfected an appeal on the
retroactivity issue.'
The court of appeals dismissed the appeal and
imposed monetary sanctions."' The Supreme Court reasoned that an
appeal, even in the face of conflicting circuit authority, was the only
means a plaintiff could use to preserve the retroactivity issue in his case
pending resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court. 2 The Supreme
Court concluded that plaintiff's position on retroactivity was not
frivolous at the time the appeal was taken.'
Therefore, plaintiff's
counsel could not be sanctioned simply for filing the appeal.'
V. EQUAL PAY ACT
Two significant Equal Pay Act cases were decided by the court of
appeals during the survey period.'
Both cases reflect the complexities presented by these types of actions to both the courts and to
practitioners. Increasingly, plaintiffs rely on the EPA to prosecute a
host of unlawful sex discrimination cases on the basis of disparate pay
for similar work.'
The rapid growth in the number of EPA cases
filed and subsequently coming before the court of appeals should be
expected to continue as a result of the burden imposed on defendants in
such actions and the complexities imposed on all parties to define and
locate appropriate comparators.

279. Id. (citing Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992); Mozee
v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992)).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. The Court noted that at the time of the appeal, there was no split of authority
among the circuits as to the retroactivity of the 1991 Act, but that the district courts were
divided on the question. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994); Meeks v.
Computer Assoc. Intl, 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994).
286. The EPA provides in relevant part:
no employer ... shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages
to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work in
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and
which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such
payment is made pursuant to... (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
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The case of Mulhall v. Advanced Security, Inc. 7 is instructive on
both the critical issues of determining the appropriate comparators in
EPA cases and explaining the defendant's proof burden at summary
judgment in such actions.'
The district court held that plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case due to her inability to identify
appropriate comparators working at the same establishment who were
afforded higher wages than her. 9 The district court reached this
decision even though Mulhall identified four different groups of potential
comparators for the court to consider.2" The court only found Group
4 to be properly comparable with plaintiff. However, the district court
concluded that defendant established an affirmative defense that a factor
other than sex accounted for any pay discrepancy which might have
existed with respect to Group 4."1 The court of appeals reversed and
remanded as to both issues.'
Mulhall, as is the case with all EPA claims, is very factually specific.
Advance Security was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Figgie International,
Inc. ("Figgie"), who was also a named defendant in the action."' 3

287. 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994).
288. Id. The respective burdens of proof in a sex discrimination case brought under the
EPA are set forth in Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1987).
Initially, the burden rests with the plaintiff to show "'that an employer pays different
wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs the performance of which
require equal skill, effort and responsibility.'" Id. at 907 (citations omitted). Additionally,
a plaintiff must prima facie identify appropriate comparators within the same establishment at which she is working who received a differential in pay. Id. Those employees
against whom plaintiff compares herself must work within the same establishment. Id.
The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the differential in pay is justified by
one of the four statutory exemptions. Id. In essence, defendant must show that sex
provided no basis for the wage differential. Defendant's burden in this respect has been
described as a "heavy one" as the exemptions within the EPA are affirmative defenses.
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974). With respect to summary
judgment under the EPA, a defendant's burden after a plaintiff has established her prima
facie case is somewhat more exacting than under the various other available antidiscrimination laws. By seeking summary judgment in an EPA claim, defendants also
"thrust[s] before the court for scrutiny not only the merits of plaintiffs evidence, but the
strength of their own defense." 19 F.3d at 591.
289. 19 F.3d at 589.
290. Id. at 588. These four different groups of comparators represented different
management employees of Figgie and Advance Security who plaintiff contended performed
equal work in jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort and responsibility
and which were performed under similar working conditions, but at different physical
locations. Id.
291. Id. at 595.
292. Id. at 600-01.
293. Id. at 588.
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Plaintiff worked for Advance Security from 1978 until 19 9 1.'9
Initially, she had been employed as a Manager of Services, 5 and then,
in 1981, she was promoted to Vice-President, Administration, a position
which she occupied until her resignation in 1991. 296

Her extensive

responsibilities in that capacity included risk management, personnel,
loss prevention, salary administration, workers' compensation, purchasing, litigation, general liability insurance claims, group insurance
programs for hourly employees, hourly personnel 401(k) programs,
salaried employees' payroll, equal employment opportunity, affirmative
action, fidelity insurance claims, contract reviews, insurance certification
programs, labor relations, applicant and employee testing programs,
licensing, leases, corporation services and staff, and the Department of
Defense industrial security program.8 7 With respect to government
contracts, Mulhall also had operational responsibility and computed
short and long term cost forecasting.'
Plaintiff was the only female within Figgie with responsibility for a
profit center in addition to her other duties as a corporate staff
Futhermore, she was the only manager or vice
department head.'
president responsible for a profit center who did not receive bonuses
based upon the profitability of the profit center. 00 Based upon all
these considerations, Mulhall filed suit after her resignation, contending,
inter alia, her disparate treatment was on account of her sex and that
this treatment violated the EPA. 301
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
on plaintiff's EPA claim. The court reasoned that plaintiff's Group 1
comparators were not proper because the men in question did not work
in the same establishment as plaintiff.'0 2 Plaintiff's Group 2 and 3
comparators were not proper, according to the district court, because
their jobs did not require substantially similar skill, effort and responsibility as compared to plaintiff's job."S Although her Group 4 comparators consisted of proper comparators, the district court determined that

294.
295.

Id.
Id.

296. Id.
297. Id.

298. Id.
299. Id.

300. Id.
301. Id. at 589. She also asserted claims against her former employer under Title VII
and under state law. The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants with respect to these claims was affirmed on appeal. Id
302. Id. at 591.
303. Id. at 592-93.
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defendants asserted a legitimate affirmative defense with respect to this
group on the grounds that the men comprising the group were paid
higher salaries than plaintiff for a reason other than sex.' The court
of appeals reversed the district court in several respects.' 5
First, the court of appeals reversed the district court with respect to
Group 1 comparators by concluding that they were employed within the
same establishment as plaintiff although they worked at physically
different locations.' The court of appeals disagreed with the district
court on whether or not, because of centralized control and functional
inter-relationship between plaintiff and the comparators in Group 1, a
single establishment existed for EPA purposes.0" For purposes of the
EPA, "establishment" is a term of art. It is defined to be "a distinct
physical place of business rather than ... an entire business or
'enterprise' which may include several separate places of business."'
Here, plaintiff worked at Advance Security's corporate headquarters
while the males comprising Group 1 each worked at military sites in
different locations." ° However, the court of appeals found significant
the fact that each of the male comparators reported to plaintiff under the
organizational structure in effect." 0 From this the court concluded
that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that a single establishment
existed for EPA purposes with respect to Group 1.1
Second, the appellate court reversed the district court on the ground
that the Group 3 comparator performed work which was substantially
similar to that performed by plaintiff.312 With respect to the Group 3
comparator (this group consisted of only one male; defendants' VicePresident, Controller), the court of appeals reversed the district court,
finding that a reasonable fact trier could infer, as plaintiff had argued
below, that the job she1 3performed was substantially similar to that of the
Group 3 comparator.
Finally, with respect to the Group 4 comparators, the appellate court
concluded that plaintiff had met her burden of proof."1 4 The district
court found that plaintiff had established a prima facie case but that

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 595.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 591.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a) (1993).
19 F.3d at 591.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 595.
Id.

19951

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1355

defendants had proved that a factor other than sex justified the pay
disparity.315 Defendants offered proof that the Group 4 comparators
were comprised of former principals or owners in businesses purchased
by defendant Advance Security, and that their salaries were set as part
of the negotiated sale of the businesses in question."' Relying on the
principle of "red circling", the district court ruled in favor of defendants
as to the group 4 comparators based upon this defense." 7 The court
of appeals reversed, finding that the principle of "red circling" does not
apply to newly-created jobs, such as those implicated by the Group 4
comparators. 318
9 the court also
In Meeks v. Computer Associates International,"'
examined the issue of what constitutes a single establishment for Equal
Pay Act purposes. 2" This time, however, even though the court of
appeals acknowledged that multiple offices may constitute a single
establishment for EPA purposes, it affirmed the district court's decision
to limit plaintiff's proffered evidence concerning pay in different offices
for substantially similar work.3 2 ' The court cautioned that "we
presume that multiple offices are not a 'single establishment' unless
unusual circumstances are demonstrated."32 A level of centralization
is necessary to justify treating workers at different locations as working
Due to decentralized
at a single establishment for EPA purposes.'
hiring and salary decisions, plaintiff was unable to prove the necessary
level of centralization to demonstrate that the multiple offices in
question were a single establishment. 24

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. "Red circle" describes "certain unusual, higher than normal, wage rates which
are maintained for many reasons." Gosa v. Bryce Hosp., 780 F.2d 917,918 (11th Cir. 1986)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 800.142).
318. 19 F.3d at 596.
319. 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994).
320. Id. at 1017.
321. Id. at 1017-18.
322. Id. at 1017.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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CMIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866 AND 1871

Section 1981
National Origin Discrimination.

Donaire v. NME Hospital,

Inc. 2' resolves a lingering question in this circuit concerning the scope
of coverage of national origin discrimination under the Civil War Civil
Rights Acts. In a per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
district court's finding that Filipinos are not a protected class under
Section 1981.2' The district court had so concluded after plaintiff
failed to present evidence that Filipinos constituted a protected class
under Section 1981.27 The district court reasoned that there was no
such class as "foreign ethnic" or "foreign ancestry" individuals protected
under Section 1981.328 Reversing, the court of appeals concluded that
Donaire's complaint satisfied the notice pleading requirements of Section
1981 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when he simply alleged
that he was subjected to intentional discrimination because of "ancestry
or ethnic characteristics."'2 9 The court of appeals was, however, able
to affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants on the merits of the case notwithstanding its mistake with
respect to the extent of coverage of national origin discrimination under
the Act.' 0
B.

Section 1983 Cases

Back Pay. Kendrick v. Jefferson County Board of Education'1
presented several interesting questions concerning the proper calculation
of back pay awards in Section 1983 cases. In the court below, Kendrick
won the battle but lost the war. The district court found that she was
wrongfully terminated from employment, but denied her any back
pay.332 The court reasoned that her earnings from interim employment, between the time of her termination and the date she prevailed
in her law suit, exceeded what she would have earned during that same

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

27 F.3d 507 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510.
13 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1511.
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time period had she not been terminated and remained an employee of
the defendant school district. 333 The district court employed an
aggregate earnings formula to calculate back pay. 34 On appeal,
Kendrick argued that a quarterly earnings formula should have been
applied instead.335 The court of appeals also discussed the question of
whether, in such cases, back pay should be calculated on a gross pay or
after taxes net pay basis. 6
With respect to the quarterly/aggregate earnings issue, the court noted
that Kendrick's interim earnings had not been uniform." 7 During
some quarters her interim earnings exceeded her projected earnings
from her old job. During other quarters, however, she earned less.
Despite the absence of any authority for so deciding, the panel concluded
that a quarterly earnings formula "more faithfully serves the remedial
objectives of Section 1983" and "promotes the consistent application of
back pay awards rendered under the NLRA, Title VII, and Section
1983."" s

With respect to the gross pay versus after-taxes net pay issue, the
court reasoned that the proper resolution of that question turns on the
corresponding issue of whether or not a particular back pay award is
subject to any form of federal, state or local taxation. 9 If the award
is not taxable, paying damages in terms of gross pay would overcompensate a plaintiff in a Section 1983 action as it would constitute more
compensation than she would have received had she not been the victim
If the back pay award is taxable,
of unlawful discrimination. 34
however, awarding a plaintiff the difference in net earnings or after tax
dollars would under-compensate her, as the award would be reduced
further in the amount of the taxes on it, leaving her less than whole. 41
Attorney Fees Under Section 1988. Loranger v. Stierheim 42
was the only significant attorney fees case reported during the survey
period. It presents the question of what amount of detail is required in
a lower court's order reducing a prevailing party's fees request so as to

333. Id. at 1511-12.
334. Id. at 1511.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id.
Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1512.
Id. at 1513.
Id. at 1514.
Id.
Id.
10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994).
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allow for review on appeal. 3" The court of appeals remanded for the
district court to enter a more precise order concerning the attorney fees
awarded in the case."
The court instructed that the district court
must provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for any
reduction to a fee award sought by a prevailing plaintiff under Section
1988.346
VII. IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT

Only one reported decision, United States ofAmerica v. FloridaAzalea
Specialists,4 6 concerned the Immigration Reform and Control Act. The
court of appeals discussed the subpoena power conferred upon an
administrative agency under the Act. 347 In terms of the administrative
enforcement powers available to federal agencies under the Act, the
decision may become a significant one. The court of appeals held that
the special counsel of the immigration related unfair employment
practices offices has authority under the Act to issue administrative
subpoenas during the investigation of charges. 3" The court concluded
that the Act authorizes the special counsel to obtain evidence from
employers during investigations and that the subpoena power is
necessary to fulfill that authorization.349

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 779.
Id. at 784.
Id.
19 F.3d 620 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 622-23.

348. Id. at 623.

349. Id. at 623-24.

